Los Angeles

California Supreme Court Decisions Referencing the Racial Justice Act (Los Angeles County)

People v. Hardin (2024)

Citation: People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 838 (Docket: S277487)

This case originated from the Los Angeles County Superior Court. The California Supreme Court primarily addressed whether a state law providing parole hearings for most young adult offenders (those under 26 at the time of their crime) but excluding those sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee. The defendant, Tony Hardin, was sentenced to LWOP for a special circumstance murder he committed in Los Angeles County at age 25.

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s judgment, holding that the legislature acted rationally. The court reasoned that the legislature could balance the recognized capacity for growth in young adults against the extreme seriousness of their crimes, and that excluding young adults who committed special circumstance murder from this specific parole program was a rational legislative choice.

The California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (Penal Code section 745) was referenced in the court’s opinion in the context of arguments made by amici curiae (friends of the court). The court noted these arguments while discussing the broader landscape of sentencing laws and reforms.

People v. McGhee (2025)

Citation: People v. McGhee (2025) (Docket: S169750)

The defendant, Timothy Joseph McGhee, was convicted in Los Angeles County of three counts of first-degree murder and four counts of attempted murder, and was sentenced to death. The convictions were related to a series of gang-related shootings in Los Angeles between 1997 and 2001.

The California Supreme Court reversed the judgment in its entirety. The reversal was based on the trial court’s improper discharge of Juror No. 5 during penalty phase deliberations. The trial court removed the juror for alleged bias and failure to deliberate, but the Supreme Court found the record did not support this conclusion. Instead, the evidence suggested the juror was permissibly skeptical of police and witness testimony based on evidence presented at trial.

After reversing the judgment and remanding the case for further proceedings, the Supreme Court concluded its opinion with an advisory note regarding the California Racial Justice Act. The court stated that the defendant “remains free to raise that claim if the prosecution elects to retry McGhee and seeks a judgment of death.”


California Appellate Court Decisions Referencing the Racial Justice Act (Los Angeles County)

People v. Millsap (2025)

Citation: People v. Millsap (2025) (Docket: B336859)

The defendant was convicted by a Los Angeles County jury in 2000 of eight counts of special-circumstance murder and numerous other crimes, resulting in eight death sentences. While his automatic, direct appeal was pending before the California Supreme Court, the Department of Corrections identified him as eligible for resentencing under a different statute, Penal Code section 1172.75, related to prior prison term enhancements.

At a hearing in Los Angeles County Superior Court, defense counsel requested the court strike the invalid enhancement and also conduct a “holistic resentencing,” which included “consideration of the Racial Justice Act.” The trial court declined to resentence the defendant, finding it lacked jurisdiction while the direct appeal was pending.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that the filing of a notice of appeal in a capital case vests exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the California Supreme Court over the entire judgment. Therefore, the superior court lacked jurisdiction to modify the sentence on any basis, including the Racial Justice Act, until the Supreme Court’s review of the direct appeal is final.

People v. Hodge (2025)

Citation: People v. Hodge (2025) (Docket: B337339M)

In 2012, the defendant, Jason Robert Hodge, was sentenced in Los Angeles County to 21 years in prison after pleading no contest to felony battery and assault. In January 2024, Hodge filed a motion in the superior court seeking relief under the California Racial Justice Act. The trial court denied the request in a single order.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, dismissed the defendant’s appeal. The court held that the trial court’s order denying the RJA motion was non-appealable because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion. The appellate court clarified a critical procedural point for the RJA: incarcerated defendants whose convictions are final (i.e., no longer on direct appeal, like Hodge’s 2012 conviction) cannot file a motion under the RJA in the trial court. The court held that for cases with final convictions, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy to raise a claim under the Racial Justice Act.

People v. Wilson (2025)

Citation: People v. Wilson (2025) (Docket: B323666)

The defendant, Gregory Wilson, was convicted by a jury in Los Angeles County of multiple charges, including human trafficking. He appealed, arguing his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the prosecutor, during closing arguments, referred to the defendant, who is Black, as a “gorilla pimp.” The defendant contended this failure to object constituted a violation of the California Racial Justice Act (RJA).

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed the conviction in a divided opinion. The majority held that defense counsel was not ineffective because the term “gorilla pimp” is a recognized “term of art” within the sex trafficking subculture, used to describe a pimp who uses significant force and violence. The court concluded the term was used to describe the defendant’s conduct, not his race.

A dissenting opinion was filed, arguing that the prosecutor’s use of the term was a “gratuitous” description that “violated the RJA.” The dissent noted that the People (the Attorney General) had conceded on appeal that the defense counsel was ineffective and argued that there was no reasonable tactical explanation for failing to object to such a “clear violation.”

People v. Lawson (2025)

Citation: People v. Lawson (2025) (Docket: B332399)

The defendant, Aquil Qadir Lawson (who is Black), was convicted by a jury in Los Angeles County of the second-degree murder of Madison Rose Weiss (who was white). The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court’s own evidentiary rulings were influenced by implicit racial bias, violating the California Racial Justice Act of 2020.

The RJA claim was based on the trial court’s decisions to exclude evidence of the victim’s illegal activities (such as sex work and fraud) while simultaneously admitting evidence of the defendant’s involvement in fraud (to impeach his credibility) and his Instagram posts. The defendant argued this created a biased narrative for the jury.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the judgment. The court concluded that the trial court’s decisions were “ordinary evidentiary rulings” based on relevance and did not demonstrate bias. The court held that the defendant failed to show by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the judge’s rulings were motivated by racial animus or bias, as required to establish an RJA violation based on a court’s actions.

People v. Hollie (2023)

Citation: People v. Hollie (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 58 (Docket: B321325)

This case from the Second Appellate District primarily concerned a petition for factual innocence. The defendant, Rodney Deon Hollie, had previously been convicted of murder but had that conviction vacated under Penal Code section 1172.6 (a resentencing statute for felony murder). He subsequently filed a petition under section 851.8 seeking a finding of “factual innocence.”

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of the factual innocence petition, holding that a conviction being vacated under section 1172.6 does not, by itself, establish that the defendant is factually innocent of the crime.

The opinion references the California Racial Justice Act (Penal Code section 745, subdivision (a)) because the defendant also attempted to raise a claim under it. The court noted in its decision that the RJA issue was “not properly before” the court in the context of the appeal from the factual innocence petition.

People v. Simmons (2023)

Citation: People v. Simmons (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 323 (Docket: B309921)

This case from the Second Appellate District (originating in Los Angeles County) is a significant published decision interpreting the Racial Justice Act. The case involved a claim of RJA violations, and the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment.

The decision is frequently cited in other RJA-related cases for its analysis of the RJA’s intent and its “per se reversal” rule, which remedies a proven RJA violation by reversing the conviction or sentence without requiring the defendant to prove that the bias affected the outcome of the case. The California Supreme Court denied review on January 10, 2024, making the appellate court’s published decision final.