California Appellate and Supreme Court Decisions Referencing Penal Code 745 (Published in 2025 – Updated 11/09/2025)

People v. McGhee (2025)

Citation: People v. McGhee (2025) (Docket: S169750)

The defendant, Timothy Joseph McGhee, was convicted in Los Angeles County of three counts of first-degree murder and four counts of attempted murder, and was sentenced to death. The convictions were related to a series of gang-related shootings between 1997 and 2001.

The California Supreme Court reversed the judgment in its entirety. The reversal was based on the trial court’s improper discharge of Juror No. 5 during penalty phase deliberations. The Supreme Court found the record did not support the trial court’s conclusion that the juror was biased or failing to deliberate. After reversing the judgment, the Supreme Court concluded its opinion with an advisory note regarding the California Racial Justice Act (Penal Code § 745), stating that the defendant “remains free to raise that claim if the prosecution elects to retry McGhee and seeks a judgment of death.”

People v. Millsap (2025)

Citation: People v. Millsap (2025) (Docket: B336859)

The defendant was convicted by a Los Angeles County jury in 2000 of eight counts of special-circumstance murder and received eight death sentences. While his automatic appeal was pending before the California Supreme Court, the defendant was identified as eligible for resentencing under a different statute (Penal Code § 1172.75) related to prior prison term enhancements.

At a hearing in superior court, defense counsel requested the court conduct a “holistic resentencing,” which included “consideration of the Racial Justice Act” (Penal Code § 745). The trial court declined, finding it lacked jurisdiction while the direct appeal was pending. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to modify the sentence on any basis, including the Racial Justice Act, until the Supreme Court’s review of the direct appeal is final.

People v. Wilson (2025)

Citation: People v. Wilson (2025) (Docket: B323666)

The defendant, Gregory Wilson, was convicted by a jury in Los Angeles County of multiple charges, including human trafficking. He appealed, arguing his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the prosecutor, during closing arguments, referred to the defendant, who is Black, as a “gorilla pimp.” The defendant contended this failure to object constituted a violation of the California Racial Justice Act (Penal Code § 745).

The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction in a divided opinion. The majority held that the term “gorilla pimp” is a recognized “term of art” within the sex trafficking subculture and was used to describe the defendant’s conduct, not his race. A dissenting opinion argued that the prosecutor’s use of the term was a “gratuitous” description that “violated the RJA” and that counsel was ineffective for failing to object.

People v. Lawson (2025)

Citation: People v. Lawson (2025) (Docket: B332399)

The defendant, Aquil Qadir Lawson (who is Black), was convicted by a jury in Los Angeles County of the second-degree murder of Madison Rose Weiss (who was white). The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court’s own evidentiary rulings were influenced by implicit racial bias, violating the California Racial Justice Act (Penal Code § 745).

The RJA claim was based on the trial court’s decisions to exclude evidence of the victim’s illegal activities while simultaneously admitting evidence of the defendant’s involvement in fraud (to impeach his credibility). The defendant argued this created a biased narrative for the jury. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, concluding that the trial court’s decisions were “ordinary evidentiary rulings” based on relevance and did not demonstrate bias motivated by racial animus as required by the RJA.

In re McIntosh (2025)

Citation: In re McIntosh (2025) (Docket: D084379)

Robert Arthur McIntosh sought the appointment of counsel for a habeas corpus petition in San Diego County, raising claims under the California Racial Justice Act (Penal Code § 745). He alleged, supported by statistical data, that the San Diego District Attorney’s Office charged enhancements more frequently against Black individuals.

The trial court denied his request for counsel. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, held that the trial court had erred. The appellate court found that the RJA (Penal Code § 1473(e)) requires a trial court to assess whether an indigent petitioner is entitled to appointed counsel based on the factual allegations, an inquiry that is independent of the prima facie showing required for an order to show cause. The court issued a writ directing the trial court to conduct the required inquiry for appointed counsel.

Jackson v. Superior Court (2025)

Citation: Jackson v. Superior Court (2025) (Docket: D084751M)

Elijah Jackson, a Black man, was charged in San Diego County with carrying a loaded firearm. He filed a motion under the California Racial Justice Act (Penal Code § 745), arguing that the police stopped and searched his car due to racial bias, supporting his claim with statistical evidence of racial disparities in traffic stops by the San Diego Police Department.

The superior court denied his motion. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, found that Jackson had produced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie violation of the RJA. The court concluded that Jackson met the standard and issued a writ of mandate, vacating the superior court’s denial and ordering an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the stop was influenced by implicit racial bias.